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Abstract
This article uses a survey experiment to examine the effects of public school dereg-
ulations on public school leaders’ support for a hypothetical private school voucher
program in California. There is no evidence to suggest that public school deregula-
tions affect public school leaders’ support for private school vouchers overall.
However, deregulations related to teacher certification and the administration of stan-
dardized tests were found to further decrease support for private school choice for
leaders of large public schools. This result may be explained by expected adjustment
costs or regulatory capture.
Keywords: Private school; School choice; School vouchers; Schooling supply;
Regulations
Introduction
Employees in traditional public schools tend not to support private school voucher
programs in the United States (Cheng, Henderson, Peterson, & West, 2019; Yettick,
Lloyd, Harwin, & Osher, 2017). This opposition could be explained by a myriad of
factors, including economic theory, risk aversion, equity concerns, and/or moral ob-
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jections. Whatever the reason, public school employees’ opposition to private school
vouchers might be driven by the expected marginal costs of the programs, which
exceed expected marginal benefits. These perceived marginal costs may include a
loss of funding for public education, less job security, more uncertainty, and unfair
competition.
All else equal, increasing benefits for public school employees in conjunction
with a new private school voucher program could theoretically increase the likeli-
hood that public school employees support the program (Becker, 2013; Friedman,
1953). In theory, public school leaders might expect to support deregulations in
public schooling operations that are perceived to increase their autonomy and gen-
eral work climate. Such deregulations could include reducing state standardized test-
ing requirements, eliminating some teacher certification requirements, and
eliminating requirements to provide transportation services for all students
(McShane, 2018). As Michael McShane (2018) argues, public and private school
supporters might be able to “come together to improve the jobs of teachers regardless
of their schooling sector” (p. 2) by reducing onerous regulations. However, deregu-
lations could also further reduce public school leaders’ support of a policy change if
they believe that the regulations are beneficial for their schools, employees, and stu-
dents. This article provides the first empirical evaluation to examine whether or not
deregulations in public schools alongside a new private school voucher program af-
fects public school leaders’ support for the program.
Using a survey experiment, leaders of traditional public schools in California in
early 2019 were randomly assigned either a control condition or one of four dereg-
ulations: reducing reporting of standardized test results, reducing standardized test-
ing requirements, eliminating some teacher certification requirements, or eliminating
transportation requirements. Participants were then asked if they would support a
hypothetical voucher program in their state. A total of 755 responses were received
from public school leaders in California for an overall response rate of 10.59 percent.
Specifically, 157 responses were received from the control group, 143 responses from
the first treatment group (reduce reporting of standardized test results), 151 re-
sponses from the second treatment group (reduce administration of standardized
tests), 160 responses from the third treatment group (eliminate teacher certification
requirements), and 144 responses from the fourth and final treatment group (elim-
inate transportation requirements). No evidence was found to suggest that any of
the four public school deregulations affect public school leaders’ support for private
school vouchers overall. However, deregulations related to teacher certification and
the administration of standardized tests were found to further decrease support for
private school choice for leaders of large public schools. This result could be ex-
plained by the capture theory of regulation (McShane, 2018; Stigler, 1971) or by fa-
vorable views of regulations by public school leaders in California.
The next section theorizes why the deregulation of public schools could increase
or decrease public school employees’ support for private school vouchers. It then
goes over the limited literature on this topic, explains the data and methods em-
ployed in the evaluation, and describes the results. The article concludes with a dis-
cussion of the survey’s implications and the need for more research on the topic.
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Theory
Employees in the public school sector typically express higher levels of opposition
to private school voucher programs than the general public. The 2018 EdNext Poll
finds that 60 percent of a nationally representative sample of teachers in the United
States and 39 percent of the general public opposes universal private school voucher
programs (Cheng et al., 2019). Holly Yettick, Sterling Lloyd, Alexandra Harwin, and
Michael Osher (2017) conducted a national survey and found that 79 percent of
teachers oppose “government funding to help pay for students’ tuition at private
schools” (p. 19). Teachers’ opposition to private school choice programs has four po-
tential explanations: economics, risk aversion, equity concerns, and moral objections.
Economic concerns
In general, students are residentially assigned to public schools in the traditional
K–12 education system in the United States (Wang, Rathbun, & Musu, 2019). Even
if families are not happy with the services provided by their traditional public schools,
residential assignment—in addition to the fact that private school voucher programs
do not exist in many areas—makes it costly for most families to choose alternative
options. If families want to opt out of their residentially assigned school, they gen-
erally have only a few choices: 1) move residences to access a different public school,
2) pay out of pocket for a private school, 3) choose a nearby public charter school,
or 4) homeschool. Some economists argue that residential assignment and funding
through property taxes create monopoly power for leaders and employees of some
traditional public schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988, 1990; Friedman, 1955; Walberg
& Bast, 2003). Some scholars argue that the local funding of schooling is perceived
to disadvantage students from lower-income families who reside in areas with lower
property-tax bases (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009), while still others argue that the
“efficiency-equity tradeoff” (Hoxby, 1996, p. 70) of local funding is not as problematic
as many believe. Regardless, some scholars argue that competitive pressures from
private school vouchers could reduce monopoly power, meaning some power might
theoretically be transferred from public school officials to individual families
(DeAngelis & Holmes Erickson, 2018). School vouchers also theoretically reduce
the cost for families to exit their residentially assigned public schools, meaning that
traditional public schools could be more likely to lose funding associated with stu-
dent enrollment counts in a choice system (Hoxby, 2001; Friedman, 1997). The
transfer of power and the potential loss of funding (through student attrition) could
theoretically increase workload (necessitated by increased responsiveness to parents)
and increase the likelihood that public school employees eventually lose their jobs
in their current public schools. However, a meta-analysis of the evidence on the com-
petitive effects of school choice finds that the impacts are generally small in size
(Jabbar, Fong, Germain, Li, Sanchez, Sun, & Devall, 2019).
Risk aversion
Five studies find that competition from school choice increases public school teacher
salaries due to reductions in monopsony power held by employers (DeAngelis &
Shuls, 2018; Hensvik, 2012; Hoxby, 2001; Jackson, 2012; Vedder & Hall, 2000).
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However, generally small increases in salaries for public school teachers might be
outweighed by the risk of losing an otherwise secure job. An individual is considered
“risk averse” if they are generally reluctant to take risks. Public sector workers tend
to be more risk averse than private sector workers (Masclet, Colombier, Denant-
Boemont, & Loheac, 2009), and public school educators tend to be more risk averse,
on average, than employees in other fields (Bowen, Buck, Deck, Mills, & Shuls,
2015). The uncertainty created by a systemic change such as private school vouchers
or changes in regulatory structure could lead to opposition by risk-averse employees.
However, changes in regulatory structure could also lead to more support from gen-
erally risk-averse employees if they believe the change would improve job security.
Risk aversion is not limited to economic or working conditions. Public school
employees may view private school vouchers as a risk for other reasons. For example,
these employees may view private school voucher models as conflicting with demo-
cratic purposes, such as national unity, political participation, and social cohesion
(Gutmann, 1999; Mann; 1855; Saltman, 2000). Concerns over increased access to re-
ligious education may also be a predictor of opposition to school vouchers, since the
majority of private schools in the United States have religious affiliations (Broughman,
Rettig, & Peterson, 2017). Public school employees may also view private school
vouchers as a risk to the least advantaged students if they believe the most advantaged
students will be more likely to use the program (Chakrabarti, 2013; Hart, 2014). 
Equity concerns and moral considerations
Public school employees may oppose school vouchers, even if they generally wel-
come competition, if they perceive that the programs create unequal playing fields.
Private schools might have more autonomy from the state than traditional public
schools. M. Danish Shakeel and Corey DeAngelis (2017) use nationally representa-
tive data from the National Center for Education Statistics Schools and Staffing
Survey and find that private school leaders are five to 20 percentages points more
likely than public school leaders to report having a major influence in six different
school activities, including establishing a curriculum, hiring teachers, setting per-
formance standards, and setting discipline policies. Private schools participating in
voucher programs must abide by additional government regulations (EdChoice,
2019); however, most school voucher programs do not require private schools to
follow all of the same top-down regulations as traditional public schools. Public
school employees may oppose private school choice if they think the competition
in the new system is unfair. Public school employees may also oppose vouchers if
they believe the programs will lead to inequalities (Cardak, 2005) and segregation
(Bunar, 2010; Levin, 1999; Ravitch, 2013; Swanson, 2017).
Public school employees theoretically weigh the expected costs and benefits of
education reforms when deciding whether or not to support programs (Becker, 2013).
In general, private school voucher programs increase the costs of support by increas-
ing uncertainty and potentially decreasing total funding, therefore decreasing the
likelihood of support. However, scholars have criticized this rational decision-making
model because social problems are often complex and because actors may have
bounded rationality (Simon, 2004; Zey, 1992). For example, rational choice theory
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suggests individuals act as rational consumers, engaging in certain actions after weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of said actions and considering alternatives (Zey, 1998) in
order to make choices that will maximize the benefits that accrue to them. Yet Mary
Zey (1998) reframed rational choice theory in terms more aligned with a bounded
rationality framework, assuming that individuals act to accrue beneficial results, not
necessarily to “maximize or optimize returns or utility” (Zey, 1998, p. 274). While
some studies have found that school choice programs can increase public school
teachers’ salaries (DeAngelis & Shuls, 2018; Hensvik, 2012; Hoxby, 2001; Jackson,
2012; Vedder & Hall, 2000), the salary benefits are expected to be small relative to
the risk of potentially losing otherwise secure jobs, and when considered within a
bounded rationality framework, those benefits may not outweigh perceived risks.
Public school employees may be less likely to oppose private school vouchers if
the programs are introduced alongside deregulations in public schools. As McShane
(2018) argues, public and private school supporters might be able to “come together
to improve the jobs of teachers regardless of their schooling sector” (p. 2) by reducing
onerous regulations. Deregulations would lead to more autonomy for public school
employees and fairer competition between traditional public schools and private
schools in a choice system. Autonomy might allow public schools to more effectively
compete with private schools in choice settings (Hanushek, Link, & Woessmann,
2013; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 2014). Private school leaders tend to have more au-
tonomy than public school leaders in the current system (Chubb & Moe, 1988;
Shakeel & DeAngelis, 2017). In December 2018, one month before this survey ex-
periment was sent out, the superintendent of Los Angeles Unified said, “So [if] it’s
the flexibility of charter schools that’s allowing them to excel, let’s bring that flexibility
into the traditional school classroom” (Blume, 2018, para. 14). The traditional public
school leaders may be more willing to support bottom-up accountability in exchange
for less top-down oversight in the form of state regulations.
However, it is possible that additional autonomy will be perceived as a cost to
public school leaders, since deregulations could lead to adjustments and additional
responsibilities. The school leaders also might view the deregulations as unfavorable
if they believe the changes will lead to unfavorable working conditions for their em-
ployees or worse outcomes for their schools and students. The deregulations might
also have no effects on the support for private school vouchers because of relatively
strong existing values and beliefs. 
Literature review
Employees in the public sector tend to be more risk averse than employees in the
private sector (Bellante & Link, 1981; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, &
Wagner, 2005; Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, & Jonker, 2002; Masclet et al., 2009).
Teachers also tend to be more risk averse than non-teachers (Davis, 1994). Daniel
Bowen, Stuart Buck, Cary Deck, Jonathan Mills, and James Shuls (2015) find that
teachers in the U.S. tend to be more risk averse than non-teachers. Similarly, Thomas
Dohmen and Armin Falk (2010) find people in Germany who select the education
profession tend to demonstrate a lower willingness to take risks than people opting
into other sectors of the economy. Carl Nadler and Matthew Wiswall (2011) report
IJEPL 16(16) 2020
DeAngelis & Burke
Deal or No Deal?
5
that teachers are less likely to support merit pay—programs that introduce some
risk into the profession—than the general public. Risk aversion might partially ex-
plain the fact that the majority of teachers oppose private school vouchers in the
United States (Cheng et al., 2019; Yettick et al., 2017).
Additional competitive pressures from school voucher programs increase uncer-
tainty and risk for employees in the public school system. However, regulations such
as standardized testing, teacher certification requirements, and transportation serv-
ices could restrict the autonomy of public school employees. Education scholars
argue that top-down standardized testing regulations might have unintended conse-
quences for public and private schools, such as increased inequality, the narrowing
of curriculum, limited teacher autonomy, and less non-cognitive skill development
(DeAngelis, 2019; Ravitch, 2004, 2016; Wolf, Hitt, & McShane, 2018). McShane
(2018) suggests that public and private school supporters should agree that certain
deregulations would be good for teachers in both sectors.
Although there is an extensive literature on the “strange bedfellows” phenome-
non in the political process (Ishiyama, 1998; King & Smith, 2008; Lusoli & Ward,
2005; Magnan, 2007), no studies have empirically examined whether or not dereg-
ulations in public schools would increase public school employees’ support for pri-
vate school voucher programs. In theory, public school employees might be more
or less likely to support private school vouchers if the programs are enacted alongside
deregulations that increase autonomy. This is the first study to evaluate this hypoth-
esis. A survey conducted in 2018 randomly assigns four different deregulations and
a control condition to 7,633 traditional public school leaders in California and asks
them if they would support a hypothetical private school voucher program in the
state. Specific deregulations were chosen to represent areas that are typically less reg-
ulated in private schools than in public schools.
This article empirically examines these four main research hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: No longer requiring public schools to administer•
state standardized tests will affect public school leaders’ support
of a hypothetical private school voucher program in California. 
Hypothesis 2: No longer requiring public schools to report standard-•
ized test results to the state will affect public school leaders’ support
of a hypothetical private school voucher program in California.
Hypothesis 3: No longer requiring public schools to hire teachers•
certified by the state will affect public school leaders’ support of a
hypothetical private school voucher program in California. 
Hypothesis 4: No longer requiring public schools to provide trans-•
portation services to students will affect public school leaders’ sup-
port of a hypothetical private school voucher program in California.
Data and research design
In the fall of 2018, a complete list of 7,633 traditional public schools in California
was obtained from the California Department of Education (n.d.-a). The list provided
the contact information of each school leader, and the city, county, zip code, and
level of each school.
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Each public school from the list was randomly assigned to one of five groups.
Although each group received a slightly different survey, the only difference across
the five surveys was the note on question number nine (see Appendix). The first eight
questions were identical across surveys and gathered background characteristics about
the respondent (e.g., position, race, and gender) and their schools (e.g., school ur-
banity, total enrollment, and the percent of students identified as qualifying for the
federal lunch program, English language learners, and racial minorities), which were
all used as control variables. These variables were used as controls because it is pos-
sible for random assignment evaluations to produce biased estimates if random as-
signment is not effective or if the sample is not sufficiently large. These control
variables made it possible to check for equivalence on observable characteristics be-
tween experimental groups to provide readers with evidence of the study’s internal
validity. These control variables also made it possible to evaluate whether the results
were robust to various model specifications. If random assignment is not effective, it
is important to control for differences in respondents and their schools, because dif-
ferent types of school leaders may have different beliefs about private school voucher
programs. For example, school leaders in rural areas may be less likely to oppose
school voucher programs than school leaders in urban areas, since there might be
fewer nearby private schools in rural areas. If random assignment is not entirely ef-
fective, it is important to control for these types of differences between experimental
groups to isolate the effects of deregulations on support for private school vouchers.
The final question on the control group’s survey asked: “Would you support a
new private school voucher program in California (available to all students in the
state) next year? Note: If this program is passed, it would not change any state re-
quirements of your school.” The surveys for all five groups were identical except for
the note on the last question. The first treatment group was randomly assigned the
following note: “If this program is passed, your school would no longer be required
to report standardized test results to the state.” The second treatment group was ran-
domly assigned the following note: “If this program is passed, your school would
no longer be required to administer state standardized tests.” The third treatment
group was randomly assigned the following note: “If this program is passed, your
school would no longer be required to hire teachers certified by the state.” The final
treatment group was randomly assigned the following note: “If this program is
passed, your school would no longer be required to provide students with trans-
portation services.” See the Appendix for the full survey instrument.
Because effective random assignment leads to equivalence on all observable and
unobservable characteristics between treatment and control groups, evaluations em-
ploying effective random assignment methodology are expected to have the highest
levels of internal validity (Freeman, Rossi, & Lipsey, 1993; Wooldridge, 2016). This
study design has strong internal validity because random chance determines the as-
signed experimental group for each public school leader in the sample. However,
strong internal validity does not imply that the study has strong external validity.
Indeed, the results from the subsequent analysis should not be extrapolated beyond
the state of California. Additionally, as the next section reveals, the respondents in
the sample are not fully representative of the population of public school leaders in
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California based on certain observable characteristics, so the results should be con-
sidered with considerable caution.
Out of the complete list of 7,633 schools, 1,563 were randomly assigned to the
control group, 1,527 to the test reporting group, 1,497 to the test administration
group, 1,533 to the certified teachers group, and 1,513 to the providing transporta-
tion group (Table 1). Initial surveys were sent to all California public school leaders
on January 7, 2019. Reminder emails were sent on January 11, January 17, January
23, January 29, February 4, February 8, and February 14. Because there were 117
duplicate emails and 389 bounced emails, the survey went out to 7,127 public
school leaders in the state (93.37 percent). By February 21, 755 public school leaders
responded to the survey, leading to an overall response rate of 10.59 percent. This
response rate falls between the response rates found in similar survey experiments
of private school leaders in California, New York (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2020),
and Florida (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2019). Another survey published by the
Hope Center at Temple University in 2019 had a response rate of 5.8 percent. The
response rate is also within the expected range of 10 to 15 percent for external online
surveys published by SurveyGizmo (Johnston, 2016) and the expected range of one
to 20 percent published by Practical Surveys (Ray, 2006).
Internal and external validity
A relatively low response rate does not lead to biased estimates if respondents do not
complete the survey based on unobservable characteristics that differ across experi-
mental groups. Indeed, Table 1 does not provide any evidence to suggest that response
rates, survey start rates, or survey completion rates differ across experimental groups.
In other words, there is not any evidence to suggest that survey respondents started
or completed surveys at different rates across groups, suggesting that it is possible to
be reasonably confident that estimates from the analytic models are unbiased.
Table 1. Response rates by experimental group
Notes: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Statistical significance was
calculated using a chi-squared test for each treatment column relative to the control group.
“Emailed” excludes observations with duplicate emails and observations with emails that
bounced. “Start rate” equals “Surveys started” divided by “Emailed.” “Response rate”
equals “Responded” divided by “Emailed.” “Completion rate” equals “Responded” divided
by “Surveys started.” Ninety percent confidence intervals are provided in parentheses.
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Assigned 1,563 1,527 1,497 1,533 1,513
Emailed 1,486 1,401 1,395 1,429 1,416
Surveys started 201 181 181 204 175




















































Table 2. Equivalence on observables
Notes: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Statistical significance was
calculated using a t-test for each treatment column. FRL is Free and Reduced Price Lunch
student; ELL is English Language Learner student.
An equivalent response rate across groups does not guarantee that survey exper-
iments are unbiased. Table 2 examines whether treatment groups are identical to the
control group on all available observable characteristics using t-tests. Statistically sig-
nificant differences are found for each treatment group. Three statistically significant
(p < 0.05) differences are detected for the test reporting group, none are detected
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Principal 92.36 93.01 90.07 91.88 88.19
Administrator 6.37 4.20 5.96 7.50 7.64
Other leader 0.64 2.80 3.31+ 0.00 3.47+
White 60.51 69.23 66.89 62.50 72.92*
Black 7.64 6.29 10.60 5.63 5.56
Asian 7.01 1.40* 4.64 3.75 2.08*
Hispanic 20.38 18.18 14.57 24.38 16.67
Other race 4.46 2.80 1.32 2.50 1.39
Male 45.22 37.06 43.05 45.63 41.67
Female 54.77 62.94 56.95 54.38 57.64
Latitude 36.28 36.15 36.21 35.86 36.05
Longitude –119.59 – 119.62 – 119.67 – 119.41 – 119.33
School
Urban 32.48 25.87 23.84+ 23.75+ 31.94
Suburban 39.49 44.76 43.71 54.38** 39.58
Rural 28.03 29.37 31.79 21.88 28.47
Elementary school 59.87 69.23+ 65.56 56.25 54.17
Middle school 14.01 13.99 7.95+ 16.88 17.36
High school 20.38 11.89* 19.87 19.38 21.53
Enrollment < 400 28.66 21.68 32.45 18.75* 24.31
400 < Enroll < 800 42.04 55.94* 44.37 45.63 50.69
800 < Enroll < 1200 14.01 13.29 8.61 18.75 14.58
1200 < Enroll < 1600 5.73 2.80 2.65 5.63 1.39*
Enrollment > 1600 9.55 6.29 11.92 11.25 9.03
Los Angeles County 17.83 19.58 17.22 15.00 15.28
Riverside County 5.73 5.59 6.62 9.38 4.86
San Diego County 8.28 8.39 4.64 6.88 10.42
San Bernardino County 3.18 8.39+ 3.97 4.38 5.56
Zip code 93483 93417 93646 93536 93452
Students
FRL percent 64.10 65.49 59.44 60.31 65.49
ELL percent 33.17 32.04 30.46 30.63 32.64
Minority percent 58.87 62.59 60.17 60.47 61.46
N 157 143 151 160 144
for the test administration group, two are detected for the “hire certified teachers”
group, and three are detected for the “provide transportation” group. By definition,
because type I errors occur five percent of the time at the p < 0.05 threshold, about
six can be expected to occur with 31 observable characteristics across four treatment
groups. Only eight statistically significant differences are observed across all groups,
so it is possible to be fairly confident that random assignment worked as theorized.
Although it is possible that these experimental groups differ on unobservable char-
acteristics, the available evidence suggests random assignment was successful.
Evidence of strong internal validity does not imply external validity. Based on
the limited amount of information on the county, city, and level of all traditional
public schools in the state, there is some evidence to suggest that this sample of re-
spondents is not representative of the entire population (Table 3). This sample ap-
pears to underrepresent schools in large counties and cities, as well as schools at the
elementary level.
Table 3. Respondents compared to all public schools
Notes: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Statistical significance was
calculated using a chi-squared test.
Specifically, respondents in this sample are about 4.6 percentage points less likely
to be a leader from a school located in Los Angeles County, three percentage points
less likely to lead a school located in Orange County, and 2.1 percentage points less
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Los Angeles 128 16.95 1,648 21.59**
San Diego 58 7.68 566 7.42
Orange 31 4.11 539 7.06**
San Bernardino 38 5.03 455 5.96
Riverside 49 6.49 411 5.38
Sacramento 13 1.72 292 3.83**
Alameda 31 4.11 286 3.75
City
Los Angeles 11 1.46 353 4.62***
San Diego 13 1.72 213 2.79+
San Jose 15 1.99 166 2.17
Sacramento 7 0.93 147 1.93+
San Francisco 11 1.46 95 1.24
Oakland 11 1.46 78 1.02
School level
Elementary school 460 60.93 5,138 67.31***
Intermediate/middle schools 106 14.04 1,155 15.13
High school 141 18.68*** 1,040 13.63
N 755 7,633
likely to lead a school located in Sacramento County than the overall population.
Respondents are about 3.2 percentage points less likely to lead a school located in
the city of Los Angeles, 6.4 percentage points less likely to lead an elementary school,
and 5.1 percentage points more likely to lead a high school than the overall popula-
tion. Because of these statistically different percentages, it is important not to gener-
alize the results to all public schools within the state of California. Additionally, study
results should be interpreted with caution since public school leaders are asked about
a hypothetical private school voucher program in the survey. The public school lead-
ers’ responses to actual policy changes may differ from their responses to a hypo-
thetical program in a survey. Further, public school leaders’ revealed preferences
may differ from their stated preferences (Alberini, 2019; Samuelson, 1948).
Data analysis
This study employs an ordered probit regression approach of the form:
Prob (Supporti2019) = β0 + β1Report_Testi2019 + 
β2Administer_Testi2019 + β3Certified_Teachersi2019 +
β4Provide_Transportationi2019 + β5Xi2019 + εit
where the categorical dependent variable of interest Support captures school leader
i’s expectation of supporting a hypothetical private school voucher program in 2019.
The dependent variable is the public school leader’s response on survey question
nine, a Likert scale ordered from one to five, with one indicating that the leader is
“certain not to support” the new program and five indicating that the leader is “certain
to support” the new program. Ordered probit regression is used (and ordered logit
regression as a robustness check) because the dependent variable of interest is or-
dered and categorical. When interpreting marginal effects, the focus is on the relative
likelihood of public school leaders in California to choose the first outcome category
(“certain not to support”).
Because effective random assignment eliminates the need for controls, the base
model only includes the four treatment indicators as independent variables. The
first binary independent variable of interest, Report_Test, takes on the value of one
if the public school leader, i, was randomly assigned a deregulation that would no
longer require the school to report standardized testing results to the state in the
note of question nine, and zero otherwise. The second binary independent variable
of interest, Administer_Test, takes on the value of one if the public school leader
was randomly assigned a deregulation that would no longer require the school to
administer state standardized tests, and zero otherwise. The third binary independ-
ent variable of interest, Certified_Teachers, takes on the value of one if the public
school was randomly assigned a deregulation that would no longer require the
school to hire teachers that were certified by the state, and zero otherwise. The
fourth binary independent variable of interest, Provide_Transportation, takes on the
value of one if the public school was randomly assigned a deregulation that would
no longer require the school to provide transportation services for students, and
zero otherwise. The coefficients on all four of these independent variables are ex-
pected to be negative, indicating that these deregulations reduce the likelihood that
public school leaders are certain not to support private school voucher programs.
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In other words, public school deregulations—alongside the hypothetical voucher
program—are expected to increase public school leaders’ likelihood of supporting
private school vouchers.
Random assignment alone does not absolutely guarantee that all endogeneity
will be removed from the models. Because of this possibility, models with vector X
of observable control variables are also included as robustness checks. These models
control for the gender, race, and position of all respondents, school urbanity, school
level, total enrollment, the percent of students eligible for the federal lunch program
(FRL), the percent of students identified as English language learners (ELL), and the
percent of students identified as racial minorities.
Multivariate normal regression is employed as a multiple imputation technique
for one missing value (0.13 percent of the sample) for school urbanity, two missing
values (0.26 percent of the sample) for the percent of students identified as ELL,
four missing values (0.53 percent of the sample) for the percent of students identified
as FRL, and five missing values (0.66 percent of the sample) for the percent of stu-
dents identified as racial minorities. While there is not an exact cutoff for when the
percentage of missing data becomes unacceptable, Joseph Schafer (1999) claims that
missing rates below five percent are inconsequential, while Derrick Bennett (2001)
contends that estimates are biased with missing rates exceeding 10 percent. The mul-
tiple-imputation approach employed here uses all other independent variables—po-
sition, race, and gender of the respondent; latitude and longitude of the response;
and county, level, and enrollment of the school—to impute missing data (Rubin,
1987). Ten observations (1.32 percent of the overall sample) that are missing the
dependent variable of interest have been dropped. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the school level.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics
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Support number 1.64 0.92 1 5 745
Certain not to support 0.59 0.49 0 1 745
Very little chance 0.25 0.43 0 1 745
Some chance 0.13 0.33 0 1 745
Very good chance 0.02 0.15 0 1 745
Certain to support 0.02 0.14 0 1 745
Respondent
Principal 0.91 0.28 0 1 755
Administrator 0.06 0.24 0 1 755
Other leader 0.02 0.14 0 1 755
White 0.66 0.47 0 1 755
Black 0.07 0.26 0 1 755
Asian 0.04 0.19 0 1 755
Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive statistics for the overall sample (Table 4) and the control group
(Table 5) illustrate that leaders of traditional public schools in California strongly
oppose the enactment of a private school voucher program in the state. The average
support number is 1.62 on a five-point scale, meaning the average public school
leader in the state is somewhere between being “certain not to support” the hypo-
thetical program and having a “very little chance” of supporting the program. A ma-
jority of the respondents (59 percent) in both the control group and the overall
sample indicated that they are “certain not to support” the hypothetical program.
Over 80 percent of the sample of respondents indicated that they would either be
“certain not to support” the program or that there is a “very little chance” they would
support the program. In both groups, only about two percent of the respondents in-
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Hispanic 0.19 0.39 0 1 755
Other race 0.03 0.16 0 1 755
Male 0.43 0.49 0 1 755
Female 0.57 0.50 0 1 755
Latitude 36.11 2.34 32.08 45.53 755
Longitude –119.53 3.63 –124.25 –75.45 755
School
Urban 0.28 0.45 0 1 755
Suburban 0.45 0.50 0 1 755
Rural 0.28 0.45 0 1 755
Elementary school 0.61 0.49 0 1 755
Middle school 0.14 0.35 0 1 755
High school 0.19 0.39 0 1 755
Enrollment < 400 0.25 0.43 0 1 755
400 < Enroll < 800 0.48 0.50 0 1 755
800 < Enroll < 1200 0.14 0.35 0 1 755
1200 < Enroll < 1600 0.04 0.19 0 1 755
Enrollment > 1600 0.10 0.30 0 1 755
Los Angeles County 0.17 0.38 0 1 755
Riverside County 0.06 0.25 0 1 755
Students
FRL proportion 0.63 0.29 0 1 755
ELL proportion 0.32 0.22 0 1 755
Minority proportion 0.61 0.28 0 1 755
dicate that they are “certain to support” a private school voucher program. Zero re-
spondents in the control group indicated that there is a “very good chance” they
would support such a program. These negative responses mostly coincide with the
2018 EdNext Poll, which finds that 60 percent of a nationally representative sample
of teachers in the U.S. oppose universal private school voucher programs (Cheng et
al., 2019).
Table 5. Distribution of support by category (percent)
Note: Averages are reported for the control group.
About 97 percent of the sample of survey respondents is either a public school
principal (91 percent) or an administrator (six percent). Two-thirds of the school
leaders are White, one-fifth are Hispanic, and less than one-tenth of the leaders are
Black, Asian, or another race. The majority of the public school leaders identify as
female (57 percent). Sixty-one percent of the respondents are leaders of elementary
schools and almost half (45 percent) of their schools are located in suburban areas.
On average, 63 percent of the students are identified as qualifying for the federal
school lunch program, 32 percent are identified as English language learners, and
61 percent are identified as racial minorities. The average percent of FRL students
reported by school leaders is similar to the percent reported by the California
Department of Education (n.d.-b) (60 percent). The average percent of ELL students
reported by the public school leaders is similar to—although higher than—the per-
cent reported by the California Department of Education (n.d.-c) (20 percent). The
average percent of students identified as racial minorities by the school leaders is
very similar to the percent of students identified as African American or Hispanic
by the California Department of Education (n.d.-d) (60 percent).
Overall results
Every analytic model fails to detect statistically significant effects of deregulations
on public school leaders’ support for private school choice in California (Table 6).
The null results exist for all five outcome categories (Table 7). Moreover, although it
was theorized that the deregulation effects would be negative (indicating more sup-
port for private school vouchers), three of the four deregulations actually have pos-
itive coefficients, indicating that those deregulations might further decrease support
for the hypothetical voucher programs. The only deregulation with the theorized
negative coefficient is for reporting standardized test results to the state—indicating
that traditional public school leaders in California dislike that particular regulation
the most. However, none of the coefficients are anywhere near statistical significance,
as p values are above 27 percent for each treatment and analytic model. The null re-
sults might be because public school leaders’ opposition to school vouchers is so

















58.62 21.55 18.10 0.00 1.72
Table 6. Effects of deregulations on reported support
Notes: P values in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Average
marginal effects are reported for the first outcome category of “certain not to support.” Models
in the last two columns use controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school
level, enrollment, urbanity, and the percentage of students identified as FRL, ELL, and minority.
Sample size is 745 because 10 observations are missing the dependent variable. Statistically
insignificant control variables are not displayed. 
While no statistical significance exists for any of the treatment dummy variables,
some control variables explained differences in support for private school vouchers
overall. School directors, minority leaders, and male leaders are more likely to sup-
port the hypothetical private school choice program. Leaders of schools with higher
proportions of FRL students are more likely to support private school vouchers,
while leaders of schools with higher proportions of students identified as racial mi-
norities are less likely to support private school choice.
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Report test – 0.034 – 0.032 – 0.042 – 0.039
(0.522) (0.572) (0.422) (0.488)
Administer test 0.015 0.018 0.008 0.014
(0.774) (0.760) (0.872) (0.798)
Certified teachers 0.057 0.057 0.052 0.056
(0.273) (0.290) (0.306) (0.301)
Transportation 0.030 0.021 0.015 0.009
(0.566) (0.697) (0.766) (0.875)
Director – 0.266* – 0.284**
(0.018) (0.008)
Other race – 0.198* – 0.206*
(0.040) (0.039)




400 < Enroll < 799 – 0.101* –0.100*
(0.024) (0.037)
FRL proportion – 0.157* – 0.171*
(0.048) (0.040)
Minority proportion 0.214* 0.232*
(0.016) (0.015)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0021 0.0018 0.0299 0.0295
Sample size (N) 745 745 745 745
Table 7. Effects of deregulations on reported support by category
Notes: P values in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Average
marginal effects are reported for each outcome category. All models employ ordered probit
regression and use controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school level,
enrollment, urbanity, and the percentage of students identified as FRL, ELL, and minority.
Specifically, school directors are about 27 percentage points (46 percent) less
likely to report being “certain not to support” the hypothetical voucher program
than school principals. Black school leaders are about 16 percentage points (27 per-
cent) less likely to report being “certain not to support” the program than White
principals. Female school leaders are about nine percentage points (15 percent) more
likely to report being “certain not to support” the hypothetical voucher program
than male leaders.
A 10 percentage point increase in the amount of FRL students in the school is as-
sociated with about a two percentage point (three percent) reduction in a school leader’s
likelihood of reporting that they are “certain not to support” the program, while a 10
percentage point increase in the amount of students identified as racial minorities is
associated with a two percentage point (three percent) increase in a school leader’s like-
lihood of reporting that they are “certain not to support” the program. Leaders in
schools with higher proportions of FRL students might be more likely to support pri-
vate school choice if they believe that students from more advantaged families will use
the program (Martinez, Godwin, & Kemerer, 1995). If the claim is true, that means
their schools would be the least affected by the policy change; however, some studies
also find that students from lower-income families tend to be more likely to apply for
vouchers (Fleming, Cowen, Witte, & Wolf, 2015; Howell, 2004).
Leaders in schools with higher proportions of racial minorities might be con-
cerned that private school vouchers could further increase racial stratification in
their schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Renzulli & Evans, 2005), despite evidence
from private school voucher programs in the U.S. indicating otherwise (Egalite, Mills,
& Wolf, 2017; Swanson, 2017). This finding could also be explained if public school
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Report test – 0.042 0.015 0.018 0.004 0.005
(0.422) (0.423) (0.420) (0.432) (0.434)
Administer test 0.008 – 0.003 – 0.004 – 0.001 – 0.001
(0.872) (0.872) (0.872) (0.872) (0.872)
Certified teachers 0.052 – 0.019 – 0.022 – 0.005 – 0.006
(0.306) (0.305) (0.313) (0.301) (0.320)
Transportation 0.015 – 0.006 – 0.006 – 0.002 – 0.002
(0.766) (0.765) (0.766) (0.765) (0.767)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R- squared 0.0299 0.0299 0.0299 0.0299 0.0299
Sample size (N) 745 745 745 745 745
leaders believe that racial minorities are more likely to apply for the voucher program,
meaning their schools would lose more students (Campbell, West, & Peterson, 2005;
Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 2010).
Results by school size
An exploratory analysis reveals some evidence to suggest that public school deregula-
tions affect the reported support of hypothetical voucher programs by leaders of schools
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Table 8. Effects of deregulations on reported support (by school size)
Notes: P values in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p < 0.001. Average
marginal effects are reported for the first outcome category of “certain not to support.” Models
in the first two columns control for school size. Models in the last two columns use controls
for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school level, enrollment, urbanity, and the
percentage of students identified as FRL, ELL, and minority. Sample size is 745 because 10
observations are missing the dependent variable. “Large” means enrollment is at or above













Report test (large) 0.015 0.013 – 0.023 – 0.027
(0.871) (0.899) (0.809) (0.790)
Report test (small) – 0.051 – 0.050 – 0.065 – 0.058
(0.419) (0.460) (0.297) (0.377)
Difference – 0.067 – 0.062 – 0.042 – 0.031
(0.558) (0.606) (0.710) (0.794)
Administer test (large) 0.175 0.195 0.206* 0.218*
(0.103) (0.101) (0.048) (0.050)
Administer test (small) – 0.030 – 0.034 – 0.050 – 0.048
(0.632) (0.602) (0.411) (0.459)
Difference – 0.205+ – 0.230+ – 0.256* – 0.267*
(0.098) (0.091) (0.033) (0.038)
Certified teachers (large) 0.141 0.171+ 0.150 0.173+
(0.128) (0.081) (0.104) (0.068)
Certified teachers (small) 0.016 0.004 0.002 – 0.004
(0.796) (0.948) (0.978) (0.951)
Difference – 0.126 – 0.166 – 0.148 – 0.177
(0.259) (0.155) (0.176) (0.120)
Transportation (large) 0.129+ 0.173 0.141 0.140
(0.085) (0.106) (0.156) (0.200)
Transportation (small) – 0.015 – 0.029 – 0.037 – 0.044
(0.801) (0.646) (0.535) (0.491)
Difference – 0.184 – 0.202 – 0.179 – 0.184
(0.110) (0.104) (0.127) (0.148)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0070 0.0070 0.0284 0.0288
Sample size (N) 745 745 745 745
with enrollments above 800 students. There is evidence to suggest that test adminis-
tration and teacher certification deregulations in public schools further decrease sup-
port for voucher programs by leaders of large public schools in California (Table 8).
Specifically, this study’s models with all controls find that no longer requiring
large public schools to administer state standardized tests increases the likelihood
that public school leaders report being “certain not to support” the hypothetical
voucher program by about 21 percentage points (36 percent). In addition, no longer
requiring large public schools to hire state-certified teachers increases the likelihood
that public school leaders report being “certain not to support” the hypothetical
voucher program by about 17 percentage points (29 percent); however, this result
is only marginally significant and robust to the two ordered logit models.
Conclusions and discussion
Descriptively, public school leaders in California are found to largely oppose a hy-
pothetical private school voucher program in their state. A majority of the respon-
dents (59 percent) in both the control group and the overall sample indicated that
they are “certain not to support” the hypothetical program. Over 80 percent of the
sample of respondents indicated that they would either be “certain not to support”
the program or that there is a “very little chance” they would support the program.
This study is the first to empirically examine the effects of proposed public
school deregulations on stated public school employees’ support for private school
voucher programs. Using a survey experiment administered in 2019, there is no ev-
idence to suggest that any of the four deregulation scenarios increase public school
employees’ support for a hypothetical voucher program in California overall. The
overall null results can be explained in at least five ways: 1) the perceived costs of
additional competition from private school voucher programs far exceeds the per-
ceived benefits of additional autonomy for public school leaders in California; 2)
the randomly assigned benefits of additional public school autonomy come with ad-
ditional costs; 3) the school leaders may have strong preexisting beliefs and values
about private school vouchers; 4) some leaders might perceive deregulations as costs
if they believe the changes will lead to unfavorable outcomes for their students or
employees; and 5) additional autonomy could also mean more adjustments and re-
sponsibilities for public school leaders. That said, there may be other explanations
that have not been considered.
The two results for large traditional public schools are positive. As one may theo-
rize, decreasing the costs associated with running a school could increase the likelihood
public school leaders support a policy change, all else equal. However, the economic
theory of regulatory capture could explain the positive result. Economies of scale sug-
gest that regulations are more likely to benefit larger firms than smaller ones (Bradford,
2004). In addition, businesses that hold a large share of the market could actually ben-
efit from government regulations if they stifle competition (Stigler, 1971).
Similarly, large traditional public schools may benefit from government regula-
tions because they are more likely to have enough revenue to cover production costs—
including regulatory costs—than smaller schools. In addition, as in other industries,
government regulations could limit the number of competitors that enter the educa-
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tion market by raising operating costs, which would benefit schools with larger shares
of the existing market. As McShane (2018) argues, “regulations can have anticom-
petitive effects … established firms can use regulations to crowd out their competi-
tion” (p. 6). Finally, because traditional public schools currently abide by standardized
testing and teacher certification regulations, larger public schools would face more
substantial costs associated with transitioning to a new competitive environment than
smaller public schools. More research needs to be done regarding possible regulatory
capture in the K–12 education system in the United States. For example, future stud-
ies should examine whether or not leaders of large private schools are more likely to
support voucher program regulations than leaders of small private schools.
This study has important limitations. The response rate was only 10.59 percent,
meaning that the results might not be representative of public school leaders in the
entire state. The study is an experiment that is administered in the field, but the re-
sults are based on survey responses. Public school leaders’ responses on a survey
about a hypothetical voucher program may not accurately reflect their support for
actual voucher programs. Also, because of the survey experiment design, the ran-
domly assigned deregulations may not have seemed real to the public school leaders,
which could have introduced attenuation bias into the analyses. Furthermore, the
survey was only sent to public school leaders in California. Results might differ in
other states and for other types of public school employees.
This research has important implications for public policy. Although some in the
public sector argue that private schools participating in school choice programs have
fewer regulations to which they must adhere relative to public schools, and thus have
an unfair advantage and do not have to “play by the same rules” (Henderson, 2019,
n.p.), this research suggests removing regulations from the public system, which may
have inherent benefits, is unlikely to increase public sector support for school voucher
programs. For public policy, growing support for voucher programs and similar
school choice policies may require different strategies. 
While these results suggest that deregulations in public schools are unlikely to
increase their leaders’ support for private school choice programs, much more re-
search on the topic is needed. This experiment should be replicated in states that
are actually deciding whether or not to pass private school voucher programs. Future
studies should evaluate the effects of deregulations on support from other types of
public school employees, such as teachers. Deregulations may be more beneficial to
public school teachers, since they are the ones providing students with direct in-
struction. Moreover, future studies should examine the effects of other benefits for
public school employees, such as salary raises, more job security, and class size re-
ductions, on their support for private school vouchers.
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Question 2: Please describe your race/ethnicity
White or Caucasian
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Asian or Asian American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
Another race/ethnicity
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Question 9: Would you support a new private school voucher program in California
(available to all students in the state) next year? Note: If this program is passed, it
would not change any state requirements of your school.






Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Question 9 says, “If this pro-
gram is passed, your school would no longer be required to report standardized
test results to the state.”
Treatment Group Two
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Question 9 says, “If this program is
passed, your school would no longer be required to administer state standardized tests.”
Treatment Group Three
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Question 9 says, “If this program is
passed, your school would no longer be required to hire teachers certified by the state.”
Treatment Group Four
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Question 9 says, “If this pro-
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